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SYMPOSIUM
The Position of the American Bar
Association on the Law of The Sea
Luke W. Finlay*
Introduction
(ABA) on
POSITION of the American Bar Association
HE
the law of the sea is set forth in a Resolution re Natural Resources
of the Sea adopted by the ABA's House of Delegates on August 6,
1973.1 Action by the House of Delegates was recommended in a
report of the ABA's Section of Natural Resources Law for which
the author of this paper acted as rapporteur.2 Under ABA rules,
3
however, the resolution alone represents official ABA policy.
The forwarding report reflects only the views of the Section of
Natural Resources Law and, by the same token, to the extent that
this paper goes beyond the resolution and report, it reflects only
4
the personal views of the author.
Discussion of the resolution will be broken down into eight
parts, corresponding to the eight headings under which the 12
paragraphs of the resolution are presented. Reference will also be

T

* Member of the Bar of the State of New York and the United States Supreme Court; Chairman, Marine Resources Committee, Section of Natural Resources Law, American Bar Association.
I American Bar Association Resolution Re: Natural Resources of the Sea Adopted
by The House of Delegates, August 6, 1973 and Report of The Section of Natural Resources Law Recommending Adoption of that Resolution, 6 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW.
589 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 A.B.A. Res.]. The entire text of the resolution is reproduced there; only the substantive paragraphs are quoted in this paper.
2 Id. at 593.
3 id.
I For further views of the writer on various aspects of the law of the sea, see
Finlay, The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf - A Rejoinder to Professor Louis
Henkin, 64 AM. J. INT'L. L. 42 (1970); Finlay, The National Interest and the Limits of
the Continental Shelf, 4 MARINE TECHNOLOGY Soc'Y J. 71 (1970); Finlay, Rights of
Coastal Nations to the Continental Margins, 4 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 668 (1971);
Finlay, Realism vs. Idealism as the Key to the Determination of the Limits of National
Jurisdiction over the Continental Shelf, in LIMITS To NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER
THE SEA 75 (G. Yates III and J. Young, eds., 1974); Finlay & McKnight, Law of
the Sea: Its Impact on the International Energy Crisis, 6 LAW AND POLICY IN INT'L Bus.
639 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Finlay and McKnight].

ABA AND LAW OF THE SEA

1976]

made to an earlier resolution on the same subject adopted by the
5
ABA's House of Delegates in August 1968.
In view of the obvious interest of participants in this conference
with the extent to which the position of the ABA is in harmony
with, or varies from, that enunciated in the Revised Draft Treaty
Governing the Exploration and Exploitation of the Ocean Bed (1971),6
prepared with accompanying comments by the United Nations (UN)
Committee of the World Peace Through Law Center, a comparison
of the two positions will be made on the major points involved.
The draft treaty will hereinafter be referred to as the WPTLC draft
treaty and the Committee comments as Pamphlet 14. Because of
limitations of space, no comment will be made on points covered
in the WPTLC draft treaty which are not within the purview of the
ABA resolution, for example, military uses of the seabed.
As will soon be seen, there are significant differences in approach. As the author sees it, these differences stem largely from
the fact that the Center's UN Committee felt little or no restraint
in working toward what it regarded as the best solution in an ideal
world; whereas the drafters of the ABA resolution concluded that
the realities of the world as it is could not, and should not, be
ignored, a view that finds support in Professor Moynihan's highly
perceptive article, The United States in Opposition,7 to which further
reference will be made at later points in this paper.
In the first place, one may not approach the law of the sea as
if it were a tabula rasa. Rights in the sea have been in the process
of development since the beginning of recorded history and rights
recognized under existing norms of international law, be it conventional or customary, may not summarily be replaced by a new set
of norms, however theoretically desirable the latter may be. We
are not yet ready for a world legislature with the same power to
make law for unwilling sovereign states that national legislatures
have, within constitutional limitations, to override local minorities.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 8 makes it clear
5
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The United States in Opposition, COMMENTARY, Vol. 59, March

1975, at 31.

8Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969) in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties]. For the
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that no state may be bound by a treaty to which it is not a party; 9
also, that where two states are parties to an earlier treaty and only
one of them is party to a later treaty on the same subject, the provisions of the earlier treaty continue to govern the relations of the
two states inter sese. 10 This means that to be viable any treaty that
comes out of the on-going deliberations of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (LOS III) must gain the broad
acceptance of the community of nations, and particularly of those
states whose rights under existing norms of international law,
whether conventional or customary, would be significantly impaired by the provisions of the new treaty. This will be touched
upon further as individual points are discussed.
It must further be borne in mind in this regard that, though the
possibility was envisioned of voluntary revision of the four 1958 conventions on the law of the sea after five years of experience following their entry into force," 1 no provision was made for termination of
the conventions or for the withdrawal of a state party. This was
explained at a plenary session of the 1958 Geneva Conference on
the Law of the Sea (LOS I) on the ground that to a very large extent the task of LOS I was to codify customary law which, by its
nature, could not be denounced and that, where new law had been
made, it had been adopted by general consent with the result that
12
there was no point in providing for its denunciation.
As to Seabed Resources of the Continental Margin
Under this heading the ABA:
(1) REITERATES its position "that within the area of exclusive sovereign rights adjacent to the United States, the interSecretary of State's letter of submittal to the President and the President's letter
of transmittal to the Senate of the United States requesting advice and consent to
ratification, see 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 234 (1972).
1 Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, supra note 8, art. 34.
10 Id. art. 3, para. 4(b).
11Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva
on April 29, 1958, art. 30, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205; Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva April 29, 1958, art. 35, [1962]
2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, done at Geneva on April
29, 1958, art. 20, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva on April 29, 1958, art. 13, [1964]
1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
122 U.N. CONF. ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, GENEVA 1958, OFFICIAL RECORDS,
(Plenary Meetings) 56-57, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/38 (1958). The discussion at
the cited pages related specifically to the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
but the rationale is equally applicable to all four conventions.
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ests of the United States in the natural resources of the submarine areas be protected to the full extent permitted by the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf," and asserts that these
areas encompass or with advancing technology will encompass
the full extent of the continental margin 13 adjacent to the
United States.
The environment must be adequately protected, and other uses of the ocean must be accommodated.
Similar rights and obligations are to be recognized in all other
coastal states. If an "economic resource zone" is agreed upon
in which the coastal state shall have exclusive rights to seabed
resources, the proposed width of 200 nautical miles is acceptable
provided that the exclusive seabed jurisdiction of the United
States should be protected to that distance or to the full width of
the continental margin, whichever is greater at any given point
on the coast. Any treaty commitment for contributions of governmental revenues from the American continental margin for
international community purposes should be limited in amount,
any larger contributions being reserved for appropriation by
Congress in the light of the overall national interest from year to
year.
(2) SUPPORTS the view that the portions of the U.S.
Outer Continental Shelf in waters deeper than 200 meters, being
now clearly within the exclusive resources jurisdiction of the
United States, acting through the Congress, should remain so,
and their subjection to any future international treaty should be
limited to standards for the prevention of unreasonable interference with other uses of the ocean, for the protection of the
ocean from pollution, for the protection of the integrity of investments, and for the compulsory settlement of disputes.14

The current position of the United States as enunciated at the
13The term "continental margin" is used in the ABA resolution and report
and also in this paper to refer to the entirety of the natural prolongation of the
continental land mass into and under the sea, including the continental shelf, the
continental slope and at least the landward portion of the continental rise overlying the continental crust.

See 1973 ABA Res., supra note 1, at 597.

This mean-

ing, which conforms to the "natural prolongation" concept that is the foundation
stone of the customary law of the Continental Shelf (see pp. 91-93 infra), avoids
the debatable ground on which those who include in their definition the entirety
of the rise, as well as the shelf and the slope, find themselves. There are situations in which portions of the continental rise lying seaward of the outer edge of
the continental crust may reasonably be regarded as part of the natural prolongation of the continents, for example, the great river cones of the Indus and the
Ganges Rivers. However, this cannot be said of the entirety of the rise everywhere that one exists. It may also be noted that when the term "Continental
Shelf" is capitalized, the term is being used in its legal and not its scientific
sense. As will be seen in the discussion to follow, there is a distinction between
the two and it is a fundamental error to attempt to interpret the 1958 Convention
on the Continental Shelf as if the term has been used in its strictly scientific
sense.

14 1973 A.B.A. Res., supra note 1, at 590.
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Geneva session of LOS III in the spring of 1975 is in close
harmony with the recommendations in paragraph (1).
Subject
to satisfactory resolution of several disputed points, the United
States is prepared to accept the widely supported concept of a 200mile economic zone within which coastal states would have exclusive jurisdiction over the natural resources of both the seabed
and the water column1
As a compromise between those widemargin coastal states which insist upon coastal state seabed
resource jurisdiction over the entire margin without any obligation
of revenue sharing and those states which are opposed to any seabed resource jurisdiction beyond the 200-mile economic zone, the
United States has proposed that recognition be given to coastal
state seabed resource jurisdiction over the entire margin where it
extends beyond the 200-mile limit but that this recognition be
coupled with an obligation of modest revenue sharing for international community purposes with respect to production from that
part of the margin lying beyond the 200-mile limit. There would be
no revenue sharing during the first five years of production from a
new field (to permit the recovery of initial exploration and drilling
costs), but sharing would start at 1 percent of wellhead value during the sixth year of production and would increase 1 percent per
year until the level of 5 percent was reached in the tenth year, re16
maining constant at 5 percent of wellhead value thereafter.
Experts familiar with oil field performance and levels of production over the life of a field have estimated that with crude oil at
$11/bbl. a 700-million barrel oil field developed on the continental
margin beyond the 200-mile limit would provide $140 million of
revenue sharing for international community purposes under this
17
formula if depleted over a 20-year period.
So much has been written on the law of the Continental Shelf
that it will be covered here in only cursory fashion. As among the
54 states party to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf,is
its provisions are controlling. For all other states and between
these other states and the states party to the Convention, the
norms of customary international law as enunciated by the Interna-

Is U.S. Delegation to LOS Ill, Press Release,
after cited as Press Release].
11Id. at 4.

May 9, 1975, at 3 [herein-

17 Id.
18See U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 372 (1975) for the 45 States
parties to the Convention.
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tional Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases19 are
controlling.
The Convention on the Continental Shelf prescribes in Article
2 that:
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its
natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are
exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore
the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one
may undertake these activities, or make claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State.
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf
do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any
express proclamation.
4. The natural resources referred to in these articles consist
of the mineral and other nonliving resources of the seabed and
subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary
species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage,
either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to
move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the
subsoil.20
The term "continental shelf" as used there and elsewhere in
the Convention is defined in Article 1 as referring:
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of
the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of
similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.21
The International Law Commission (ILC), which drafted the
language of Article 1,22 made it abundantly clear that by its use of
the term "continental shelf" it did not intend to adhere strictly to
the geological concept of the continental shelf. Thus, its 1956 report states that:
. . . exploitation of a submarine area at a depth exceeding 200
metres is not contrary to the present rules, merely because the
23
area is not a continental shelf in the geological sense.
19 [1969] I.C.J. 3; 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

340 (1969).

20Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 11, art. 2.
21

Id. art. 1.

22 With the exception of an amendment to make specific reference to islands

in Article 1(b), which was added at LOS I. See (1956) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
296, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 for the ILC text, which is found
in Article 67 of its draft of a comprehensive treaty on the law of the sea.
23 Id. at 297, Commentary on art. 67, para. 7.
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The ILC, in its earlier deliberations, had first agreed in 1951
upon exploitability alone24 and had then shifted in 1953 to the
200-meter water depth alone 2s as the limit of coastal state jurisdiction over seabed resources in adjacent submarine areas beyond
the territorial sea. It finally decided in 1956 to recommend the
language later incorporated into the 1958 Convention embracing
both the 200-meter water depth and the exploitability concept.
The moving force leading the ILC's 1956 decision was the action of a Specialized Conference of the Organization of American
States a few weeks earlier, on March 28, 1956, in asserting the
jurisdiction and control of the American States over the seabed and
subsoil of the continental and insular terrace (which the Conference
defined as including the continental shelf and the continental slope
"from the edge of the shelf to the greatest depths"), or other
submarine areas adjacent to their coasts but outside the territorial
sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of their
26
natural resources.
Myres McDougal and William Burke say of this conference, in
their highly regarded work, The Public Order of the Oceans, that
it had a "decisive effect upon the discussions in the International
Law Commission and its ultimate recommendation."27 They go
on to say that, though the ILC refused to incorporate the term
"continental terrace" into its definition, the language actually
adopted by it in its final draft had the same effect as the Ciudad
Trujillo Resolution. 28 The Chairman of the 1956 session of the
ILC, F. V. Garcia Amador, is in emphatic agreement with this
view. 29 The U.S. Delegate to LOS-I, Arthur H. Dean, declared
himself to the same effect in the course of the ratification hearings
on the Geneva conventions before the Foreign Relations Committee
of the United States Senate. His testimony was as follows:
The clause which protects the right to utilize advances in
technology at greater depths [than 200 meters] beneath the
24Id. at 296, Commentary on art. 67, para. 1.

Id. at 296, Commentary on art. 67, para. 3.
Final Act, Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural
It is to be noted
Resources: the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters, 13, 34 (1956).
that the affirmative vote of the U. S. Delegation in favor of the resolution had the
2

26

express concurrence of the Department of State, 4
LAW 837 (1965).
27 M. McDOUGAL &
28
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oceans was supported by the United States and was in keeping
with the inter-American conclusions at Ciudad Trujillo in 1956.
It was included in the ILC 1956 draft. 30
It was in this sense that the United States Senate gave its advice
and consent to ratification of the Convention by the United
31
States.
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the International
Court of Justice embraced the submerged prolongation of the
continental land mass into and under the sea as the juridical basis
of continental shelf rights, saying:
[w]hat the Court entertains no doubt is the most fundamental
of all the rules of law relating to the continental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, though
quite independent of it, - namely the rights of the coastal State
in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a
natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea
exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the
land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent right. In
order to exercise it, no special legal process has to be gone
through, nor have any special legal acts to be performed. Its
existence can be declared (and many States have done this) but
does not need to be constituted. Furthermore, the right does
not depend on its being exercised. To echo the language of the
Geneva Convention, it is "exclusive" in the sense that if the
coastal State does not choose to explore or exploit the areas of
shelf appertaining to it, that is its own affair, but no one else
32
may do so without its express consent.
The cases before the Court involved disputes between the
Federal Republic of Germany and its North Sea neighbors to the
north and the west, Denmark and the Netherlands, as to their
respective Continental Shelf rights in the North Sea. Denmark
and the Netherlands were parties to the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf, but the Federal Republic of Germany was not
3 Hearing on Conventions on the Law of the Sea Before the Senate Comm.

on

Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1960); 42 DEP'T STATE BULL. 258 (1960).
See also Whiteman, Conference on the Law of the Sea: Convention on the Continental
Shelf, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 629, 733 n.21 (1958). Miss Whiteman was U.S. representative on Committee IV at LOS I, which was responsible for the preparation of
the Convention on the Continental Shelf.
31B. Oxman, 3 J. MARITIME L. 245, 445, 683 (1972), argues for a somewhat
different interpretation of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, but, in
the view of this writer, the interpretation there given cannot stand against the
clear authority to the contrary cited above.
32 [1969] I.C.J. 3, 22; 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 340, 357 (1969).
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and the Court found that the latter had done nothing to bind it to
the terms of the Convention. The cases, therefore, had to be decided on the basis of customary international law and it was on
that basis that the pronouncement of the Court cited immediately
above was made. After concluding that Article 6 of the Convention relating to boundaries between adjacent and opposite
states was not itself a codification of customary law and hence
not binding on the Federal Republic of Germany, and giving
consideration to the 'physical configuration of the coastline in
the light of customary law, the Court laid down guidelines33
under which the three litigant States divided among themselves
seabed resource rights extending some 156 nautical miles from the
coast of Europe to the common boundary with the Continental
Shelf of the United Kingdom.M
It is an indisputable scientific fact that the continental shelf
and the continental slope are surface manifestations, namely, the
top and the front, respectively, of the same rocks. Also, it is these
rocks in their entirety that constitute the natural prolongation of
the land territory of the coastal state into and under the sea. As
Menard and Smith put it, in explaining their combination of the
continental shelf and the continental slope as a single province in
their paper, Hypsometry of Ocean Basin Provinces:
• . . [s]helf and slope are grouped because they are merely the
top and front of the margins of continental blocks2 s
It so happened that only the physical continental shelf was in
dispute in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases; but there would
be no logic whatever in attempting to limit the natural prolongation
concept to the physical continental shelf in its geomorphological
sense in contradistinction to the continental slope and there has
been no effort whatever to do so in the widespread practice of
states. According to a recent count some 50 coastal states have
33[1969]
34 The
OF

I.C.J. 3, 53-54; 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 340, 384-85 (1969).
156 nautical-mile figure is from OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER,
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3 Menard & Smith, Hypersotnetry of Ocean Basin Provinces, 71 J. GEOPHYSICAL
RESEARCH 4308 (1966). See also the testimony of the late Dr. William T. Pecora to
similar effect before the Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, STAFF OF
SENATE

COMM.

ON

INTERIOR

ON

THE

OUTER

MATERIALS

&

INSULAR

CONTINENTAL

AFFAIRS,
SHELF

91ST CONG.,

1ST

SESS.,

SELECTED

42 (Comm. Print 1969) (Mem-

orandum by the Chairman to Members of the Comm. on Interior and Insular

Affairs).

ABA AND LA W OF THE SEA

1976]

authorized offshore exploration for, and exploitation of, oil and
natural gas in waters deeper than 200 meters, extending in some
instances to depths as great as 12,000 feet. 36 This has led the
eminent British authority, Professor R. Y. Jennings, to express
th, belief that, as a consequence of this widespread state practice,
his a priori conclusion that the coastal states have exclusive jurisdiction over the continental slope and the subsoil of that part of the
natural prolongation of their land mass was in the process of confirmation as a matter of customary international law. 37 This is a
view with which the author is in full accord.
Pamphlet 14 does not undertake an analysis of the law of the
Continental Shelf, but it does include the statement that the Moratorium Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 15, 196938 was adopted in the light of a then present limit
to commercial exploitability of 200 meters and "froze" exploitation at that depth. 39 This statement was offered in support of
the WPTLC draft treaty proposal that the resources of the ocean
bed and the nonliving resources of the high seas beyond the first
depth of 200 meters outside the territorial sea should appertain to
the UN and be subject to its jurisdiction, subject only to a veto
power of the littoral states over exploitation by nonnationals
within 50 miles of their coasts and a right on their part to share in
50 percent of the net proceeds to the UN from exploitation within
40
the 50-mile zone.
It seems clear that the suggestion that the Moratorium Resolution "froze" national jurisdiction under the exploitability clause
of the Geneva Convention at the December 1969 state of the art of
offshore development is expressly controverted by the record and
that the proposal to internationalize the mineral resources of the
high seas beyond the 200-meter isobath is nonnegotiable.
As to the first point, Mr. Garcia Robles, in speaking for Mexico in support of the Moratorium Resolution on the floor of the UN
General Assembly immediately prior to the vote on its adoption,
pointed out, without dissent, that the draft resolution does not
Offshore Petroleum Development and Potential, in 2 MARITIME
181, 187 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Gould], citing data
supplied by the Foreign Scouting Service of Petroconsultants, S.A. as his source.
37 R. Jennings, The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction: Some Possible Implications of the North Sea CaseJudgement, 18 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 819, 830 (1969).
38 G. A. Res. 2574-D (XXIV), 24 U. N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 11, U. N. Doc.
36

H.

STUDIES

Gould,

MANAGEMENT

A/7630 (1970).
supra note 6, at 10.
Id. at 9, art. 1; at 16-17, art. 13; at 17-18, art. 13(A)(iii).

39 WORLD PEACE,
40
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pronounce itself on the size of the area - or how far it extends nor on the limits of national jurisdiction.41 Mr. Phillips, in speaking for the United States in opposition to the resolution, alluded
to the same point, saying that not only was the resolution undesirable from the practical standpoint as tending to discourage the
development of deep sea mining techniques that ought to be going
forward but that the resolution was likely to encourage some states
that wanted to engage in exploration or exploitation of seabed
resources to move toward unjustifiably expansive claims of national jurisdiction as a means of circumventing the Moratorium. 42
There was not the slightest suggestion from anyone in the course
of the debate on the resolution that it was intended to apply to the
entire seabed of the high seas beyond the 200-meter isobath, and
the resolution would never have received the same degree of sup43
port that it did receive had it so provided.
The target of the Moratorium Resolution was manganese
nodule mining from the deep seabed, not petroleum exploitation on
the continental margins. Otherwise, it would be impossible to
explain the total absence of diplomatic protest against the many
leases and concessions that have been granted on the continental
margins beyond the 200-meter isobath both before and after the
adoption by the UN General Assembly of the Moratorium Resolution.
The only opposition to such leases and concessions of
which the author is aware is that which has arisen in a few instances in which more than one coastal state has laid claim to
seabed resource jurisdiction over the same portion of the conti44
nental margin.
As to the second point, it is expected that at least 50 percent of
new discoveries of oil and natural gas will come from beneath the
floor of the sea. 45 The present heavy dependence of much of the
41 U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1833, at 3 (1969).
42 Id. at 6-11.
43 At the date of adoption of the Moratorium Resolution, many of its adherents
were pressing for agreement on a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone,
which in most parts of the sea would extend several times farther to sea than the
200-meter isobath. Thus, for the 106 countries listed in J. ALBERS, M. CARTER,
A. CLARK, A. COURTY & S. SCHWEINFURTH, SUMMARY: PETROLEUM AND SELECTED
MINERAL STATISTICS FOR 120 COUNTRIES, INCLUDING OFFSHORE AREAS 125 (table 1)
(U.S. Dep't of Interior Geological Professional Paper 817, 1973) [hereinafter
cited as ALBERS], the total shelf area to the 200-meter isobath is 6,247,600 sq. n.m.;
the total area to the 200 n.m. limit is 24,006,300 sq.n.m., or nearly four times as
great!
44See, e.g., S. Harrison, Oil Rush in East China Sea Becoines a Three-Nation
Issue, Washington Post, Oct. 14, 1970, at A12, Col. 1.
45 Gould, supra note 36, at 183.
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world on Middle East oil supplies, 46 the dramatic escalation that
took place in oil prices following the October 1973 war in the Middle East, 47 and the drastic effect that this escalation has had on the
economies of oil importing countries, large and small, developed
and developing alike, all magnify the importance to the coastal
states of the potential petroleum resources of their continental
margins. As a consequence, it is highly unrealistic to expect that
any coastal state will renounce rights to these resources to which
it has a clear claim under existing norms of international law.
Despite the substantial amount of domestic production of oil
and natural gas that the United States enjoys, it is already dependent upon imports for some 35 percent of its total requirements
of petroleum.48 Though the ABA resolution was adopted two
months prior to the outbreak of the October 1973 war in the Middle East, the trend toward increasing dependence on imports was
already apparent.
Subsequent events have served only to accentuate the soundness of the ABA position in support of the
retention by the United States, in common with other coastal
states, of the full limit of Continental Shelf rights secured by
existing norms of international law.
A two-thirds voting majority in favor of narrow coastal state
seabed resource jurisdiction could be obtained in LOS III through
the combined vote of 29 landlocked countries, 19 shelflocked
countries and 47 countries facing the open sea with less than
40,000 square nautical miles of continental margin apiece; 49 but
the result would be a nontreaty. These 95 countries among them
have only some 955,000 square nautical miles of continental margin, or less than two-thirds that of the single country of Australia
alone.s ° Australia and nine other countries - Canada, Indonesia,
USA, USSR, New Zealand, Argentina, Norway, Japan, and Brazil
16 Of the worldwide total production of 51.1 million b/d of crude oil in April,
1975, 18.7 million b/d, or 37%, came from the Middle East, OIL & GAS J., June 23,
1975, at 171.
47 See Finlay and McKnight, supra note 4, at 639 & n. 2 .
49 Gould, supra note 36, at 187.

49 The number of landlocked and shelf-locked countries is from Hodgson and

McIntyre, National Seabed Boundary Options, in LIMITS TO NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SEA 152, 166 (G. Yates III and J. Young, eds., 1974); the 47
countries with less than 40,000 sq. n.m. of continental margin apiece are drawn, in
part, from Table 1, ALBERS, supra note 43, at 125 and, in part, from Hodgson and
McIntyre, Table 4, at 160-64. It is to be noted that these tables give areas to the
3,000-meter isobath, which is a sufficiently accurate approximation of the area of
the margin for the purposes of the point being made in the text.
50Table 1, ALBERS, supra note 43, at 125.
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in the descending order of their continental margins - have some
7,909,200 square nautical miles of continental margin among them,
or 59.3 percent of the continental margins of the entire group of
106 countries bordered by oceans or inland seas for which shelf
and margin statistics are given in Summary Table 1 of Geological
Survey Professional Paper 817, U.S. Dep't of the Interior (1973).sl
There is substantial merit in the acceptance of a modest level
of revenue sharing from the outer portions of the margin in exchange for international agreement on a precise limit for the legal
Continental Shelf, and this is the rationale of the latest U.S.
proposal previously mentioned. Yet, though this proposal was
limited to the area of the continental margin beyond the 200-mile
limit and was held to a maximum level of 5 percent of wellhead
value that would not be reached until the 10th year of production,5 2 it is still far from acceptance by the coastal states with
margins more than 200 nautical miles in width. A quick analysis
of a map prepared by the Office of the Geographer, U.S. Depart53
ment of State, entitled Composite Theoretical Division of the Seabed,
indicates that there are 22 countries some part of whose continental slopes extend more than 200 nautical miles from the coast and
that there are another 27 countries some part of whose continental
rises do so, including countries such as India and Pakistan with
their legitimate claims to the seabed resources of the great cones
of the Indus and Ganges Rivers. This suggests the clear need for
agreement in LOS III on a broad definition of Continental Shelf
rights along the line recommended by the ABA if a viable treaty
is to be attained.
To conclude the discussion under this heading, it may be noted
that paragraph (2) of the ABA resolution was addressed to a domestic United States problem which has since been resolved along
the lines recommended by the ABA.
When a temporary informal suspension of leasing on the U.S.
Outer
51

Continental Shelf (OCS)4 beyond the 200-meter isobath

Id.

52 See note 16 supra.

1 Oice of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence & Research, U.S. Dep't
of State, Composite Theoretical Division of the Seabed (Map No. 562101, 1973).
54 "Outer
Continental Shelf" is used in the sense defined in Section 2(a) of
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1953), to include all
submerged lands lying seaward of the areas ceded to the jurisdiction of the coastal
states of the United States under the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301
(1953), "of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are
subject to its jurisdiction and control." Since the entry into effect of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, this language has been construed in harmony with
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was lifted in the spring of 1973 because of the need of finding
new domestic sources of petroleum, the Executive Branch of the
federal government prescribed that any new OCS leases in waters
deeper than 200 meters would be subject to any new international
regime to be agreed upon. 55 In view of the high degree of uncertainty as to the additional financial and other burdens that
might be imposed upon OCS leases under an as yet undetermined
treaty,5 6 this requirement put prospective OCS lessees in an extremely difficult position and imperiled the highly lucrative bonus
system of leasing under which the federal government had received
billions of dollars of bonuses on OCS lease sales.51 In addition,
no other of the numerous countries that have opened up for development their continental margins beyond the 200-meter isobath
had imposed a similar burden upon itself or its lessees or licensees.
Accordingly, on further consideration, the policy was reversed in
the fall of 1973 and standard OCS leasing procedures have applied
58
to the entire OCS ever since.
As to Seabed Resources Seaward of the Limits
of NationalJurisdiction
Under this heading of the resolution the ABA:
(3) RECOMMENDS that the United States insist that
any international regime established with respect to the areas
seaward of the limits of national jurisdiction incorporate the
following principles:

(a) That the United States and other developed countries
have representation in the governing council which gives
adequate weight to the economic importance of the resource to their people;
(b) That any international authority created be administrative and regulatory only, with power to allocate
areas, and that it have no control over volume or rates of
production, distribution or pricing of seabed resources.

(4) RECOMMENDS that the United States implement
its announced policy of encouraging exploration and exploitation
that of the Convention; Barry, The Administration of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. Vol. 1 No. 3, July 1968, at 38.
1538 Fed. Reg. 9839, 17,743, 27,307 (1973).
16 See Finlay and McKnight, supra note 4 at 673 & n.185.
57 Bonus payments on 87 bids accepted by the United States Department of
the Interior as a result of a single lease sale on December 20, 1973 totaled
$1,490,065,230, with the bonus payment on the most costly single lease running to
$36,805 per acre, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 21, 1974, at 39.
5s 38 Fed. Reg. 30,457 (1973).
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of seabed resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
during the negotiation of a treaty and supports the companion
policy of seeking the provisional entry into force of the seabed
59
mining aspects of any treaty that is agreed upon.
Also pertinent to this topic is the recommendation in the 1968
resolution of the ABA that the arrangements to be agreed upon
for the international seabed area should be such as to:
.... assure, inter alia, freedom of exploration by all nations on
a nondiscriminatory basis, security of tenure to those engaged
in producing the resources in compliance with such rules, encouragement to discover and develop these resources, and optimum use to the benefit of all peoples. 6°
The rationale of subparagraph (3)(a) is obvious. The developing
countries not only have an overwhelming numerical superiority in
the United Nations; they have also shown a strong determination
to work closely together in the natural resources field to strength61
en their economic power vis-a-vis the industrialized countries.
If the industrialized countries and their nationals are to get a fair
shake in the development of the mineral resources of the international seabed area in the light of such recent developing-country
power plays as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,
to which Professor Moynihan makes particular mention in the
article of his mentioned above, 62 it is essential that there be a
weighted voting system for the governing council of the international regime so designed as to assure evenhanded treatment of
developed and developing countries alike.
Subparagraph (3)(b) has a dual motivation. The first part of
this subparagraph is based on the same reasoning that gave rise to
the age-old objection to a single individual's serving in the triple
role of prosecutor, judge and jury over his fellow men. It is against
human nature to assume that an international regime which is both
a licensing and regulatory body on the one hand and an operating
agency on the other hand would not tend to favor itself over its
licensees in innumerable ways. The result would be an irreversible
trend toward state socialism at an international level. This is what
the Group of 77 has insisted on from the beginning63 - to the
51 1973 A.B.A. Res., supra note 1, at 590-91.
60 1968 A.B.A. Res., supra note 5, at 441.

Moynihan, supra note 7, at 35.
Id. at 38; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, U. N. Doc.
A/9946 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States].
63 See Press Release, supra note 15, at 45.
The group of 77's view is reflected
61
62
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point that it is likely to be the single most difficult obstacle to
agreement on a viable treaty - but it most emphatically is not in
the interest of the industrialized countries and there is good reason
to doubt that it is in the real interest of the developing countries
themselves. As Professor Moynihan puts it in his incisive article, The United States in Opposition, in speaking of the almost universal Fabian socialist policies of the developing countries:
And here is the nub of the bad news; for all the attractions of
this variety of socialist politics, it has proved, in almost all its
versions, almost the world over, to be a distinctly poor means
of producing wealth. Sharing wealth - perhaps. But .not producing wealth. 64
If the international regime is administrative and regulatory
only, each state or group of states acting jointly can decide for
itself whether to rely on private enterprise or state enterprise in
the exploration and exploitation of the areas of the deep seabed
licensed to it or its nationals. It might be a refreshing eye-opener
for the world to let proponents of the two systems compete on
equal terms under an international regime designed to assure absolute impartiality in the issuance and regulation of licenses.
As to the second aspect of subparagraph (3)(b), there is no
valid reason why land-based production of minerals should have a
preferential status over production from the international seabed
area. Nor is there any reason whatever why land-based producer
interests should be put ahead of consumer interests. Even the
developing consumer countries seem to have awakened to this
latter point despite the solidarity of the Group of 77 on most issues.
If there is valid reason at any time for an international commodity
agreement, it should be negotiated on a global basis in which individual countries with either land-based or sea-based production
and consuming countries alike are adequately represented. Unilateral control of seabed production alone cannot serve the broad
interests of the community of nations as a whole and the industrialized countries should not find themselves alone in opposing
it.
The first part of paragraph (4) of the resolution relates to
President Nixon's Statement on U.S. Oceans Policy of May 23,
1970, in which he included the statement, undoubtedly addressed
in Articles 21 and 22 of Part I of the Informal Single Negotiating Text prepared
by the Chairman of the First Committee of LOS III at the close of the 1975
session in Geneva, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 8/Part 1, at 9 (1975); 14
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
&4

682, 688 (1975).

Moynihan, supra note 7, at 39.
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to the Moratorium Resolution of the previous December, that the
negotiation of a law of the sea treaty might take some time and
that he did not believe that it was either necessary or desirable to
try to halt exploration and exploitation of the seabeds beyond a
65
depth of 200 meters during the negotiating process.
The reference to the 200-meter water depth alluded to an earlier
proposal of the President in the same statement that there be international agreement on the point where the high seas waters
reach a depth of 200 meters as the outer limit of coastal state seabed resource jurisdiction, with only a coastal state trusteeship
over the balance of the margin. 66 After the United States shifted
to its present position. in support of broad coastal state seabed
resource jurisdiction,67 it did open up for development the portion
of the U.S. continental margin beyond the 200-meter isobath, as
previously noted. Aside, however, from recommending provisional
entry into force of the deep seabed mining provisions of any treaty
coming out of LOS 111,68 it has done nothing affirmative to encourage manganese nodule mining from the deep seabeds beyond
the continental margins.
Instead, until the failure of the Geneva session of LOS III to
reach agreement on a treaty or even to recommend that the UN
General Assembly call for a treaty to be concluded during the
1976 session(s) of LOS III, the Administration had consistently
urged delay by Congress in acting on proposed legislation to assist American manganese nodule miners or to protect American
fisheries stocks. 69 As of this writing, the Administration is in
the process of reexamining its position on such legislation in the
light of developments at Geneva and has requested Congress to
65

6

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

678 (1970).

66 Id. For the U.S. draft treaty of August 3, 1970 implementing the statement
of President Nixon, see Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National jurisdiction, Report, 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 21, U.N. Doc. A/8021 (1970), Annex V, Draft United Nations Convention
on the International Sea-Bed Area (Working paper submitted by the United
States of America) 130 at 132, 138-40.
67 First announced in a statement by Hon. John R. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, in plenary
session, August 10, 1972; U.S. Mission in Geneva, Press Release, Aug. 10, 1972
at 2-3. For the latest announcement, see Press Release, supra note 15, at 4.
68 See U.S. Mission to the United Nations, New York, Press Release
USUN-20 (73), March 19, 1973.
61 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Status Report
on Law of the Sea Conference, Sept. 17, 1974, Pt. 2 at 825-30, 1087-89.
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delay action until that reexamination is completed and can be dis70
cussed with the appropriate Congressional committees.
It is to be noted that the United States, by its affirmative vote
in the UN General Assembly on the 1970 Declaration of Principles, has committed itself to the position that no interim actions
taken by it or its citizens would give rise to any sovereign rights or
claim of sovereign rights over any part of the international seabed
area to be agreed upon or would create any rights with respect to
the area or its resources incompatible with the international regime to be established.71
In the light of this commitment, there is no legitimate reason
for concern that interim activity in the deep seabed would imperil
a future treaty. To the contrary, there is a strong likelihood that it
would provide a badly needed incentive to the Group of 77 to
moderate their present extreme demands. There is reason to believe that they regard time as working on their side, with the
possibility of increasing concessions from the United States and
other developed countries the longer agreement on a treaty is delayed. Action to dispel such an attitude could have only a salutary effect. If it is the position of the Group of 77 that under no
circumstances will an American mining company be allowed to
operate in the international seabed area for its own account, the
United States should throw down the gauntlet on that point without further delay.
The WPTLC draft treaty is in accord with the ABA position
that the international regime should not itself engage in exploitation and that it should be governed on a weighted voting basis
protecting all interests. 72 On the other hand, it would authorize
preferential treatment of developing countries in the allocation of
licenses and would provide for a type of production control applicable only to deep seabed mining,7 3 points with which the author
is in obvious disagreement. It would also incorporate the international seabed regime as a United Nations corporation and give
the United Nations civil and criminal jurisdiction over the area. 74
70 See statement by Hon. John Norton Moore, Chairman of NSC lntcragency
Task Force on the Law of the Sea, before the Senate Commerce Comm., The
National Oceans Policy Study, June 3, 1975.
71 U.N. Press Release
GA/4355, Dec. 17, 1970; 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

220, 221 (1971).
72 WORLD PEACE,

supra note 6, at 18-19, arts. 13(A)(iv) & 13(B)(ii).

73 Id. at 17-18, art. 13(A)(iii).
74 Id. at 16, art. 13 and at 18, art. 13(A)(vi).

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 8: 84

There is, of course, no possibility that LOS III will move in that
direction.
As to Fishery Interests
Under this heading of the resolution, the ABA:
(5) SUPPORTS the position on fisheries expressed by
the United States delegation to the United Nations Seabed
Committee, which seeks to assure the rational use and conservation of all fish stocks by adopting broad coastal State management of coastal species, host State management of anadromious species, and international management of highly migratory
species, such as tuna.75
It may be noted at this point that the WPTLC draft treaty
and Pamphlet 14 are silent on the subject of fisheries. Though
the issue is far from settled, broad support seems to be developing
in LOS III for coastal state management of coastal species within
the proposed 200-mile economic zone, subject to the requirement
that fishermen of other states be given access to any part of the
economic yield of a species that is not taken by local fishermen.
Progress also appears to have been made on the subject of host
state control of anadromous species beyond the economic zone. 6
In the light of the pronouncement of the International Court of
Justice in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases"7 rejecting unilateral assertions of exclusive coastal state jurisdiction over broad expanses of
the sea, one would have also expected some progress on the question of highly migratory species such as tuna, which has been such
a bone of contention between the U.S. tuna fishermen and Ecuador, Peru and Chile; but apparently none has been forthcoming to
date."
As to Protection of the Environment
Under this heading of the resolution, the ABA:
(6) RECOMMENDS that provision be made for establishment of internationally agreed standards for the prevention of marine pollution, to the ends
(a) That the marine environment be adequately protected;
(b) That, with respect to vessels engaged in international
751973 A.B.A. Res., supra note
76Press Release, supra note 15,
77
79

1, at 591.
at 3.

13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1049, 1090 (1974).
Press Release, supra note 15, at 3.
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navigation, there be a single set of uniform standards, internationally determined;

(c) That, with respect to exploration and exploitation
activities on the seabed, the community interest in the oceans
be recognized by acceptance and enforcement of international standards everywhere beyond the territorial sea, but
with the possibility of supplemental, more exacting, coastal
State standards within the areas of special economic interest
to such States;
(d) That liability for pollution by vessels and by seabed
activities be strict but finite and insurable, with supplementation, if need be, by an international fund or funds."9
The WPTLC draft treaty does not deal specifically with the
question of vessel pollution, nor does it deal with the issue of
national versus international standards for the protection of the
environment.
It does, however, include a provision imposing
absolute liability for damage to the ocean environment. 80 The
recommendation of the ABA for strict, but finite and insurable,
liability, with supplementation, if need be, by an international fund
or funds is predicated on the difficulty in evaluating and making
adequate advance provision for the type of claims that could arise
-from activities in the international seabed area. The oceans are
so vast, the coastlines bordering them so extensive, and the potential claimants of all nationalities so numerous that it seems much
the wiser course, if the use of the seas and the exploitation of their
resources are to be encouraged for the benefit of all mankind, to
follow the pattern of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 81 as supplemented by the International Convention on the Establishment of an International
82
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage.
The argument in favor of a single set of international standards
for the prevention of pollution by vessels engaged in international
navigation is an intensely practical one and seems to be gaining
support in LOS 111. 83 There are well over 100 coastal states and
to allow each and every one of them to impose its standards on
the design, construction and operation of every vessel transiting
79 1973 A.B.A. Res., supra note 1, at 591-92.

80WORLD PEACE, supra note 6, at 13, art. 6.
s International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done
Nov. 29, 1969; 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 45 (1970).

82International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, done Dec. 18, 1971; 11 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 284 (1972).
83 Press Release, supra note 15, at 5.
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its economic zone or territorial sea even though not destined for its
ports would create an intolerable situation that no country dependent upon international maritime commerce should be willing to
accept.
As to Unimpeded Navigation and Transportation
Under this heading of the resolution, the ABA:
(7) SUPPORTS the principles that straits which have
historically been open for international maritime traffic are
international waters whose status should be protected against
change as a result of any agreement of the breadth of the territorial sea, and that, as international waters, they should be
subject to internationally agreed rules for the safety of navigation
and prevention of pollution, with the proviso that any powers
granted to coastal States in enforcement of international safety
or anti-pollution regulations applicable to such waters be accompanied by adequate provisions for the prompt release under
bond of any vessel of foreign registry detained under such
regulations.
Further SUPPORTS the acquiescence by the
United States in the recognition of a 12-mile territorial sea, subject to adequate safeguards against such actions impairing the
world community's existing rights of free movement through,
and overflight of, straits which have historically been open for
international maritime traffic.
Further SUPPORTS the authority of the United States and other coastal States to provide
for and regulate the peaceful use of the seabed of the adjoining
continental margin in aid of navigation and transportation.
(8) RECOMMENDS comparable provisions to assure the
right of unimpeded transit through archipelagic waters.
(9) SUPPORTS the view that coastal States have the
right to establish deep water ports on the continental margins
adjacent to their territorial sea and to operate them under their
exclusive control, provided that they do so in such a manner as
to avoid unreasonable interference with international navigation
or other high seas freedom, and that any new international treaty
dealing with the subject should so provide. 84
The salient points with respect to paragraph (7) are unimpeded
transit and overflight and international versus national regulations
for safety of navigation and the prevention of pollution. There are
some 116 straits between 6 and 24 nautical miles in width, including
such important ones as the Straits of Dover, Gibralter, Hormuz and
Malacca; and it is unrealistic to expect that the maritime countries
would relinquish their high seas freedoms with respect to these

straits by agreement on an unqualified 12-mile territorial sea, as a
84

1973 A.B.A. RES., supra note 1, at 591-92.
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comparison of the relevant provisions of the Convention on the
High Seas and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone will readily demonstrate.85
The same, of course,
applies equally to archipelagic waters, which are covered in paragraph (8).
As to paragraph (9), the United States has already acted in reliance upon the principle enunciated in this paragraph by the enactment of the Deepwater Port Act of 1974. 86 It has also introduced
in LOS III a draft article that would confirm the exclusive right of
87
the coastal state in this regard.
The WPTLC draft treaty does not touch upon any of the topics
covered under this heading of the ABA resolution.
As to Integrity of Investments

On this point, the ABA resolution:
(10) RECOMMENDS that the
in seabed resources be fully assured. 88

integrity of investments

This recommendation is based on the basic principle of international law that agreements made in good faith should be adhered
to and that investments made in reliance on such agreements
should be protected against expropriation except for an overriding
public need and then only against prompt, adequate and effective
compensation. This is a principle of which the developing
countries have made a shambles in recent years, more and more of
them having pressed for an unrestricted and unrestrained control
over their natural resources to the point that the UN General
Assembly on December 12, 1974 adopted a Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States prescribing, inter alia, that each state has
the right:
85 The Convention on the High Seas specifically prescribes freedom of
navigation and freedom to fly over the high seas as freedoms to coastal and noncoastal states alike, supra note 11, art. 2. By contrast, under the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the coastal state has absolute
sovereignty over the airspace over, and seabed and subsoil under, the territorial
sea and is required to open the waters of its territorial sea only to foreign ships
that are in "innocent passage," which is defined as passage "not prejudicial to
the peace, good order or security of the coastal State." This is a vague and often
subjectively applied test, in addition to which the Convention expressly prescribes
that submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag, supra note
11, arts. 2 & 14, a requirement not now applicable to international straits more
than 6 miles wide.
86 Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1501 (1975).
87 THIRD
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To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of

foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should
be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances
that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its
tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States
concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of
sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle
of free choice of means. 89

It is hard to imagine anything less calculated to encourage the
foreign investment so urgently needed for the economic development of the developing countries in general, or seabed resources in
particular, than this short-sighted policy and it is to be hoped that it
will not be incorporated into whatever treaty comes out of
LOS III, either expressly or by implication. The United States
is in the forefront of the countries whose rapid economic development was enhanced in its early stages by massive investment of
foreign capital and the developing countries would do well to
profit by its example of the benefits to flow from providing a
stable investment climate.
As to Determination of Disputes
On this point, the ABA resolution:
(11) RECOMMENDS that provision be made for compulsory determination by an international tribunal of disputes relating to marine resources between States, or between any international organization and a State, or between either of them
and a foreign private party.A0
The ABA and the WPTLC draft treaty are agreed on the importance of this point, although the author cannot agree with the
proposal in the latter that the election of judges to the international
tribunal be made by the UN General Assembly. 91 It is just as
important that there be impartiality in the adjudication of developed/developing, democratic/socialist/communist
differences in
the interpretation and application of the treaty as there is that there
be impartiality in the functioning of the governing council. The
WPTLC draft treaty provides for the latter through a system of
89Charter

of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 62, at 6, art.

14.
90 1973 A.B.A. Res., supra note 1, at 592.
91 WORLD PEACE, supra note 6, at 22-23, art. 14.
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weighted voting and it would have done well to propose that the
selection of judges be a joint function of the governing council and
the treaty assembly, paralleling the system of selection of judges for
the International Court of Justice as a joint function of the UN
General Assembly and the Security Council. 92
Progress seems to have been made at Geneva on alternative
procedures for the compulsory settlement of disputes but much remains to be done. 93 If there is ever to be world peace through
law, it is hard to think of a better place for a start than in the
proposed new treaty on the law of the sea. There is no reason in
logic or equity why all aspects of the treaty should not be subject to
compulsory dispute settlement.
Yet, some of the developing
countries that categorically reject international adjudication of
foreign investment disputes are tending to view activities of foreign
contractors or licensees within that part of the sea subject to coastal
state economic jurisdiction in the same light as foreign investments
on their land territory.94 It will be a blow to world peace through
law and a disincentive to foreign investment should the final text of
the treaty recognize such an exception to its compulsory dispute
settlement provisions.
As to Scientific Research
On this point, the ABA resolution:
(12) SUPPORTS the general principle of freedom of scientific research, but recognizes the right of coastal States,
within internationally agreed guidelines designed to provide
maximum practicable application of this principle, to impose
reasonable restrictions on their continental margins which will
entail threats to their national security or hazards to the environment as by drilling into the seabed. 95
The entire world benefits from scientific research and this
author has always given wholehearted support to the general principle of maximum freedom of scientific research. At the same
time, coastal states have a measure of control at the present time
under the provisions of the Convention on the Continental Shelf,%
and it is not realistic to think that they will, or should, give it up in
92 L.C.J. STAT.,
13

art. 4.

Press Release, supra note 15, at 5.

94 THIRD

UNITED

NATIONS

CONFERENCE ON

THE LAW

OF

THE SEA,

SD Gp/2nd-Sess./No. 1/Rev. 5 (1975) art. 17; 14 INT'L LEGAL
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951973 A.B.A. Res., supra note 1, at 592.
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its entirety. A scientific research vessel of the type of the Glomar
Challenger, if it were indiscreet enough to drill in waters deeper than
200 meters just beyond the 12-mile limit off the coast of Santa Barbara, California, would have the capability of causing a blowout
that would dwarf to minuscule proportions the highly publicized
1969 commercial oil spill in that vicinity. Just to mention this possibility is proof enough of the soundness of the ABA recommendation to work for meaningful relaxation - not total elimination - of
present coastal state controls of scientific research beyond the
territorial sea.
Conclusion
While Professor Moynihan's article, The United States in Opposition,9 7 was addressed to the broad question of United States
policy within the United Nations vis-a-vis the developing countries,
the points he makes so vividly are no less applicable to the specific
issues facing the United States in LOS III. In a nutshell, the
developing countries as a body have embraced Fabian socialism
in the British mold, with redistribution, not production, of wealth
98
central to its ethos.
To paraphrase the words of Professor Moynihan, they have
moved the UN from its original, essentially liberal vision as a regime of international law and practice which acknowledges all
manner of claims, but claims that move in all directions, to one of
advocacy, within the economic field, in only one direction, that of
redistribution of wealth to the benefit of the developing countries. 99 The acme of this trend came, as Professor Moynihan
notes, with the solemn adoption by the UN General Assembly at
the close of its 1974 regular autumn session of the previously mentioned Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 100 according
each state the right to deal with foreign investments pretty much at
will. After citing another example, a quotation from India's Prime
Minister Indira Ghandi, he goes on to say:
Now there is nothing unfamiliar in this language: only the
setting is new. It is the language of British socialism applied to
the international scene. 01
97 Moynihan, note 7 supra.

18Id. at 32.
9 Id. at 38.
100See note 62 supra.
101Moynihan, supra note 7, at 38-39.
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It seems to the writer that it is high time for the members of the
World Peace Through Law Center and other participants in the
October 1975 Washington World Law Conference to stand up and
be counted. If they are genuinely in favor of world peace through
law, they must lend their efforts to a solution of LOS III that will
provide equal opportunities for all. If a two-thirds voting majority
is to force through a treaty permeated with the stamp of Fabian
Socialist philosophy on an international scale, not only would such
action be a death blow to the viability of the treaty itself, it would,
in association with other recent actions within the United Nations
and its associated organizations, imperial the total effort to utilize
that body as a principal highway to world peace through law.

